A Multi-server Oblivious Dynamic Searchable Encryption Framework

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Abstract. Data privacy is one of the main concerns for data outsourcing on the cloud. Although standard encryption can provide confidentiality, it also prevents the clients from searching/retrieving meaningful information on the outsourced data thereby, degrading the benefits of using cloud services. To address this data utilization vs. privacy dilemma, Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (DSSE) has been proposed, which enables encrypted search and update functionality over the encrypted data via a secure index. Despite a lot of efforts, state-of-the-art DSSE constructions still leak significant information from the access pattern, making them vulnerable against various practical attacks. While generic Oblivious Random Access Machine (ORAM) can hide the access pattern, it incurs a logarithmic communication overhead, which was shown costly to be directly used in the DSSE setting.

In this article, by exploiting the multi-cloud infrastructure, we develop a comprehensive Oblivious Distributed DSSE (ODSE) framework that allows oblivious search and updates on the encrypted index with high security and improved efficiency over the use of generic ORAM. Our framework contains a series of ODSE schemes each featuring different levels of performance and security required by various types of real-life applications. ODSE offers desirable security guarantees such as information-theoretic security and robustness in the presence of a malicious adversary. We fully implemented ODSE framework and evaluated its performance in a real cloud environment (Amazon EC2). Our experiments showed that ODSE schemes are $3\times-57\times$ faster than using generic ORAMs on a DSSE encrypted index under real network settings.

Keywords: Searchable encryption, Write-only ORAM, Multi-server PIR, Privacy-preserving clouds

1. Introduction

The concept of storage-as-a-service provides a comprehensive storage architecture for companies or individuals to store data on the cloud, thereby reducing the data management and maintenance cost. Despite its usefulness, recent data breach incidents on such systems have shown the imperative of preserving the confidentiality of sensitive data stored on the cloud. Although standard encryption (e.g., AES) can preserve data privacy, it also prevents the users from searching or retrieving meaningful information from outsourced data, which completely invalidates the benefits of using cloud storage services. To address the data utilization vs. privacy dilemma, the concept of searchable symmetric encryption

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(SSE) was introduced [1]. Since then, many SSE schemes have been developed in attempts to offer practical query functionality while, at the same time, preserving user privacy and data confidentiality. In the following sections, we first review the ongoing research on SSE and outline the security limitations of state-of-the-art approaches.

1.1. State-of-the-arts and Limitation

SSE. Song et al. were the first to propose the concept of SSE [1]. Later, Curtmola et al. [2] defined indistinguishability under the adaptive chosen keyword attack (IND-CKA2) as a formal security notion for SSE, and presented an IND-CKA2-secure scheme supporting single keyword search. The security is achieved by constructing a secure index (I) representing the relationship between keywords and encrypted files (F), both of which (⟨I, F⟩) are outsourced to the cloud. Several refinements based on this index model have been proposed to offer more functionality and query diversity such as ranked query [3] and/or multi-keyword search [4, 5]. The main limitation of these constructions is that they are only static, meaning that they can only perform a search on the encrypted data with no update allowed after the setup. Kamara et al. were among the first to propose Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (DSSE) [6], which enables both search and update functionalities on encrypted files. After their studies, many DSSE schemes have been proposed, each offering distinct performance, functionality and security trade-offs [6–12].

Information Leakages in SSE and Limitations of Other Approaches. SSE without relying on the encrypted index has been shown to be vulnerable against many attacks [13, 14]. On the other hand, although the encrypted index-based SSE is known to be more secure, it still leaks a lot of information that the adversary can exploit to conduct statistical attacks [15–17]. For instance, when the client performs a search on the encrypted index, the search token in DSSE might reveal the content files to be updated in the future as well as all of the historical updates on files matching with the token. These leakages are defined as forward-privacy and backward-privacy, respectively [18]. Zhang et al. showed that it is possible to learn which keywords have been searched in forward-insecure DSSE schemes through file-injection attacks [17]. Most efficient DSSE schemes [6, 7, 19, 20] do not provide forward- and backward-privacy when searching on I. Although there are some forward- and backward-private DSSE schemes being proposed recently (e.g., [8, 21]), they rely on costly public key operations [22]. More severely, since the search, update and retrieval queries in DSSE are deterministic, all standard DSSE schemes leak access patterns on both I and F. In particular, the client leaks the file-access pattern when updating a file or when retrieving a set of files matching with the search query performed on the encrypted index. Similarly, the client leaks the index-access pattern when performing the search or update on the encrypted index. Liu et al. [16] demonstrated a practical attack that can determine which keywords being searched by observing the search pattern.

To seal most of the access pattern leakage in DSSE, one can use a 1 generic Oblivious Random Access Machine (ORAM) technique [23] to conduct oblivious access on I and F. Garg et al. [24] proposed TWORAM, which optimizes the use of ORAM to hide file access patterns in DSSE2. Despite its merits, prior studies such as [7, 25] stated that generic ORAM [23] is too expensive to be used in DSSE setting due to its logarithmic client-bandwidth overhead. Although ORAM schemes with a constant bandwidth

1By generic ORAM, we mean the technique that can hide whether the access is to read or to write as opposed to read-only Private Information Retrieval or Write-Only ORAM.

2It differs from the objective of this paper, where we focus on hiding access patterns on the encrypted index in DSSE (see §8 for clarification).
complexity have been introduced recently [26], they rely on costly cryptographic protocols (i.e., homomorphic encryption [27]), whose performance was shown worse than bandwidth-logarithmic ORAMs [28]. Alternative solutions trying to avoid generic ORAM are either very costly or unable to seal access pattern leakage in DSSE [29, 30].

1.2. Our Contributions

In DSSE, it is necessary to seal access pattern leakages when accessing the encrypted index (I) and encrypted files (F).

Since the size of individual files in F can be arbitrarily large and each search/update query might involve with a different number of files, to the best of our knowledge, generic ORAM seems to be the only option for oblivious access on F. In this paper, we focus more on oblivious access techniques on the index (I) that are more bandwidth-efficient than using generic ORAM (Figure 1). Specifically, we propose ODSE, a comprehensive oblivious encrypted index framework in the multi-server setting with the application to DSSE. The framework contains three ODSE schemes including ODSEwoxor, ODSEwo.ro and ODSEwo.it each offering various performance and security properties as follows.

- **Full obliviousness with information-theoretic security:** ODSE seals significant information leakages when accessing the encrypted index that lead into statistical attacks. Strictly speaking, our constructions hide the index-access pattern, provide forward- and backward-privacy and secrecy of the query types (search/update). ODSEwoxor and ODSEwo.ro offers computational security for the encrypted index as well as access operations on it. On the other hand, ODSEwo.it provides information-theoretic statistical security (see §5).

- **Low end-to-end delay:** All ODSE schemes offer low end-to-end-delay, which are $3 \times - 57 \times$ faster than using generic ORAM atop the DSSE encrypted index (with optimization [24]) under real network settings (see §8).

- **Robustness against malicious adversary:** In the present work, we provide secure methods not only in the honest-but-curious setting but also in the malicious environment. Our ODSE schemes offer various levels of robustness in the distributed setting. In the semi-honest setting, ODSEwo.ro and ODSEwo.it are robust against corrupted servers that do not respond due to system/network failure. All ODSE schemes can be extended to be secure against malicious adversary. Specifically, the extended ODSEwo xor scheme can detect if there exists any malicious server (but without knowing which server it is). The
extended ODSE schemes can not only detect which server(s) is malicious, but also be robust against incorrect replies by malicious servers.

- **Full-fledged implementation and open-sourced framework:** We fully implemented all the proposed ODSE schemes in both semi-honest and malicious settings, and evaluated their performance on real-cloud infrastructure. To the best of our knowledge, we are among the first to open-source an oblivious access framework for the encrypted index in DSSE, which can be publicly used for comparison and adaptation (see §8).

**Improvement over the IFIP DBSec’18 Conference Version [31].** This article is the extended version of [31], which includes the following improvements. First, we introduce a new ODSE scheme called ODSE, which is a hybrid scheme between ODSE and ODSE originally presented in [31]. ODSE inherits the best of both worlds, in which it features low search/update delay and robustness in the malicious setting. Second, we fully extended all the proposed ODSE schemes into the malicious setting, which was only discussed briefly in [31]. Third, we conducted more experiments to evaluate the performance of the new ODSE scheme as well as all the extended ODSE schemes in the malicious setting with different number of corrupted servers. Finally, we have made our improved source-code publicly available at https://github.com/thanghoang/ODSE.

## 2. Preliminaries and Building Blocks

### 2.1. Notation

We denote a finite field as $\mathbb{F}_p$, where $p$ is a prime. Operators $\|\|$ and $\oplus$ denote the concatenation and XOR, respectively. $\langle \cdot \rangle_{\text{bin}}$ denotes the binary representation. $[N]$ denotes \{1, ..., N\}. $u \cdot v$ denotes the dot product of two vectors $u$ and $v$. $x \sim S$ denotes that $x$ is randomly and uniformly selected from $S$. Given $I$ as a row/column of a matrix, $I[i]$ denotes accessing the $i$-th component of $I$. Given a matrix $I$, $I[s, j \ldots f]$ denotes accessing columns $j$ to $f$ of $I$. $I[i, s]$ and $I[s, j]$ denotes accessing the entire row $i$ and column $j$ of $I$, respectively. Let $E = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be an IND-CPA symmetric encryption [32]: $\kappa \leftarrow E.\text{Gen}(1^{|})$ generating key with security parameter $\lambda$; $C \leftarrow E.\text{Enc}(M, c)$ encrypting plaintext $M$ with key $\kappa$ and counter $c$; $M \leftarrow E.\text{Dec}_c(C, c)$ decrypting ciphertext $C$ with key $\kappa$ and counter $c$. Let $\Sigma = (\text{Gen}, \text{Mac}, \text{Vrfy})$ be a secure Message Authentication Code (MAC) scheme [32]: $\theta \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Gen}(1^{|})$ generating a MAC key with security parameter $\lambda$; $\tau \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Mac}_\theta(m)$ generating a tag for message $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ with key $\theta$; $\{0, 1\} \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Vrfy}_\theta(m, \tau)$ verifying if the tag ($\tau$) associated with the message ($m$) is either valid (1) or invalid (0).

### 2.2. Shamir Secret Sharing

We present $(t, \ell)$-threshold Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme [33] in Figure 2. Given a secret $b \in \mathbb{F}_p$ to be shared, the dealer generates a random $t$-degree polynomial $f$ and evaluates $f(x_i)$ for each party $P_i \in \{P_1, \ldots, P_T\}$, at point $x_i$ which is a non-zero element of $\mathbb{F}_p$. $x_i$ is used to identify party $P_i$ (SSS.CreateShare algorithm). We denote the share for $P_i$ as $[b]_i$ for $1 \leq i \leq \ell$. The secret can be reconstructed by combining at least $t + 1$ correct shares via Lagrange interpolation (SSS.Recover algorithm).

SSS is a $t$-private secret sharing scheme in the sense that any combinations of $t$ shares leak no information about the secret. SSS offers homomorphic properties including addition, scalar multiplication,
that is, given a vector \( v \) and partial multiplication. We extend the notion of SSS-share of value to indicate the share of a vector. That is, given a vector \( v = (v_1, \ldots, v_n) \), \([v]_i = ([v_1]_i, \ldots, [v_n]_i)\) indicates the share of \( v \) for party \( P_i \), in which each component in \([v]_i\) is the SSS-share of the corresponding components in \( v \).

2.3. Private Information Retrieval

Private Information Retrieval (PIR) technique enables private retrieval of a data item from a (unencrypted) public database server. PIR in the distributed setting is defined as follows.

**Definition 1 (multi-server PIR [34, 35]).** Let \( b = (b_1, \ldots, b_n) \) be a database consisting of \( n \) items being stored in \( \ell \) servers. A multi-server PIR protocol consists of three algorithms as follows. Given an item \( b_j \) in \( b \) to be retrieved, the client creates queries \( \{\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_\ell\} \leftarrow \text{PIR.CreateQuery}(j) \) and distributes \( \rho_i \) to server \( S_i \) for each \( i \in \{1, \ldots, \ell\} \). Each server \( S_i \) responds with an answer \( r_i \leftarrow \text{PIR.Retrieve}(\rho_i, b) \). Upon receiving \( R = \{r_1, \ldots, r_\ell\} \) answers, the client computes the value of item \( b \) by invoking the reconstruction algorithm \( b \leftarrow \text{PIR.Reconstruct}(R) \).

A multi-server PIR is correct if the client can obtain the correct value of \( b \) from \( \ell \) answers via PIR.Reconstruct algorithm with the probability 1. A multi-server PIR is \( t \)-private if \( \forall j, j' \in \{1, \ldots, n\}, \forall \mathcal{L} \subseteq \{1, \ldots, \ell\} \) s.t. \( |\mathcal{L}| \leq t \), the probability distributions of \( \{\rho_{j \in \mathcal{L}} : (\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_\ell) \leftarrow \text{PIR.CreateQuery}(j)\} \) and \( \{\rho_{j' \notin \mathcal{L}} : (\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_\ell) \leftarrow \text{PIR.CreateQuery}(j')\} \) are identical.

We recall two efficient multi-server PIR protocols as follows.

- **XOR-based PIR [36].** It relies on XOR trick to perform the private retrieval, in which the database \( b \) contains \( n \) items \( b_i \), each being interpreted as a \( m \)-bit string (Figure 3).

- **SSS-based PIR [34, 35].** It relies on SSS to improve the robustness of multi-server PIR, in which the database \( b \) contains \( n \) items \( b_i \), each being interpreted as an element of \( \mathbb{F}_p \) (Figure 4).

**Write-Only ORAM.** ORAM allows the user to hide access patterns when accessing their encrypted data on the cloud. In contrast to generic ORAM where both read and write operations are hidden, Blass et al. [37] proposed a Write-Only ORAM scheme, which only hides the write pattern in the context of hidden volume encryption. Intuitively, \( 2n \) memory slots are used to store \( n \) blocks, each assigned to a distinct slot and a position map is maintained to keep track of block’s location. Given a block to be rewritten, the client reads \( O(\lambda) \) slots chosen uniformly at random and writes the block to a dummy slot among \( O(\lambda) \) slots. Data in all slots are encrypted to hide which slot is updated. By selecting \( \lambda \) sufficiently large, one
\[(\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_\ell) \leftarrow \text{PIR}^{\forall}_{\text{CreateQuery}}(j): \text{Create query for a database size } n\]

1: Initialize binary string \(e \leftarrow 0^n\) and set \(e[j] \leftarrow 1\)
2: for \(i = 1, \ldots, \ell - 1\) do
3: \(\rho_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n\)
4: \(\rho_\ell \leftarrow \rho_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus \rho_{\ell - 1} \oplus e\)
5: return \((\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_\ell)\)

\(r_i \leftarrow \text{PIR}^{\forall}_{\text{Retrieve}}(\rho_i, b): \text{Retrieve an item in the DB } b\)
1: Parse \(b\) as \((b_1, \ldots, b_n)\)
2: Initialize \(r_i \leftarrow \{0\}^{|b_i|}\)
3: for \(j = 1, \ldots, n\) do
4: if \(\rho_i[j] = 1\) then
5: \(r_i \leftarrow r_i \oplus b_j\)
6: return \(r_i\)

\(b \leftarrow \text{PIR}^{\forall}_{\text{Reconstruct}}(\mathcal{R}): \text{Reconstruct the item}\)
1: Parse \(\mathcal{R}\) as \(\{r_1, \ldots, r_\ell\}\)
2: \(b \leftarrow r_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus r_\ell\)
3: return \(b\)

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\([[e_1], \ldots, [e_\ell]] \leftarrow \text{PIR}^{\forall}_{\text{CreateQuery}}(j): \text{Create select queries}\)
1: Let \(e := (e_1, \ldots, e_n)\), where \(e_j \leftarrow 1, e_i \leftarrow 0\) for \(1 \leq i \neq j \leq n\)
2: for \(i = 1, \ldots, n\) do
3: \([[[e_1]], \ldots, [[e_\ell]]] \leftarrow \text{SSS}\cdot\text{CreateShare}(e_i, t)\)
4: for \(l = 1, \ldots, \ell\) do
5: \([e_l] \leftarrow [[[e_1]], \ldots, [[[e_n]]]]\)
6: return \([[e_1], \ldots, [e_\ell]]\)

\(b_j \leftarrow \text{PIR}^{\forall}_{\text{Retrieve}}([[e_j]], b): \text{Retrieve the item}\)
1: \([b_j] \leftarrow [[e_j]] \cdot b\)
2: return \([b_j]\)

\(b \leftarrow \text{PIR}^{\forall}_{\text{Reconstruct}}(\mathcal{B}, i): \text{Recover the retrieved item from the set of answers } \mathcal{B}\)
1: Parse \(\mathcal{B}\) as \(\{[b_1], \ldots, [b_\ell]\}\)
2: \(b \leftarrow \text{SSS}\cdot\text{Recover}(\mathcal{B}, i)\)
3: return \(b\)

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Fig. 3. XOR-based PIR [36].

Fig. 4. SSS-based PIR [34, 35].

can achieve a negligible failure probability, which might occur when all \(\lambda\) slots are non-dummy. It is also possible to select a small \(\lambda\). In this case, the client maintains a stash component \(S\) of size \(O(\log n)\) to temporarily store blocks that cannot be rewritten when all read slots are full.

3. System and Security Models

In this section, we present the system and security models of our framework.
3.1. System Model

Our system model comprises a client and $\ell$ servers $S = (S_1, \ldots, S_\ell)$, each storing a version of the encrypted index. The encrypted files are stored on a separate server different from $S$ (as in [29]), which can be obliviously accessed via a generic ORAM scheme [23, 38]. In this paper, we focus only on oblivious access on distributed encrypted index $I$ on $S$. We present the definition of ODSE as follows.

Definition 2. An Oblivious Distributed Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (ODSE) scheme is a tuple of one algorithm and two protocols $ODSE = (\text{Setup, Search, Update})$ where input and output for the client and servers are separated with semicolon such that:

1. $(\sigma, I) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\mathcal{F})$: Given a set of files $\mathcal{F}$ as input, the algorithm outputs a distributed encrypted index $I$ and a client state $\sigma$.

2. $(R; \bot) \leftarrow \text{Search}(w, \sigma; I)$: The client inputs a keyword $w$ to be searched and the state $\sigma$; the servers input the distributed encrypted index $I$. The protocol outputs to the client a set containing file identifiers, in which $w$ appears.

3. $(\sigma', I') \leftarrow \text{Update}(f_{id}, \sigma; I)$: The client inputs the updated file $f_{id}$ and a state $\sigma$; the servers input the distributed encrypted index $I$. The protocol outputs a new state $\sigma'$ and the updated index $I'$ to the client and servers, respectively.

3.2. Security Model

In our system, the client is trusted and the set of servers $S$ are untrusted. We first consider the servers to be semi-honest, meaning that they follow the protocol faithfully, but can record the protocol transcripts to learn information regarding the client’s access pattern. Later, we show that our framework can be extended to be secure against malicious servers that can tamper with the input data to compromise the correctness and the security of the system (§6). We allow up to $t < \ell$ (privacy parameter) servers among $S$ to be colluding, meaning that they can share their own recorded protocol transcripts with each other. Formally, the security of ODSE in the semi-honest setting can be defined as follows.

Definition 3 (ODSE security w. r. t. semi-honest adversary). Let $\vec{\delta} = (op_1, \ldots, op_q)$ be an operation sequence, where $op_i \in \{\text{Search}(w, \sigma; I), \text{Update}(f_{id}, \sigma; I)\}$, $w$ is a keyword to be searched and $f_{id}$ is a file with identifier $id$ whose relationship with unique keywords in the distributed encrypted index $I$ need to be updated, and $\sigma$ denotes a client state information. Let $ODSE_i(\vec{\delta})$ represent the ODSE client’s sequence of interactions with server $S_i$, given an operation sequence $\vec{\delta}$. Correctness: An ODSE is correct if for any operation sequence $\vec{\delta}$, $\{ODSE_1, \ldots, ODSE_\ell\}$ returns data consistent with $\vec{\delta}$, except with negligible probability.

T-security: An ODSE is $t$-secure if $\forall L \subseteq \{1, \ldots, \ell\}$ such that $|L| \leq t$, for any two operation sequences $\vec{\delta}_1$ and $\vec{\delta}_2$ where $|\vec{\delta}_1| = |\vec{\delta}_2|$, the views $\{ODSE_{i\in L}(\vec{\delta}_1)\}$ and $\{ODSE_{i\in L}(\vec{\delta}_2)\}$ observed by a coalition of up to $t$ servers are (perfectly/statistically/computationally) indistinguishable.

ODSE operation obliviousness. By Definition 2, keyword search and file update are the two main operations in searchable encryption. Given that these operations might incur different procedures, we can trigger both search and update protocols for any actual action to achieve the operation obliviousness according to Definition 3. In this case, the server can guess (at best) with a probability of $\frac{1}{2}$ what operation the client is performing “in real” i.e. either search or update.
Table 1
ODSE Symbols and Notations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N,M</td>
<td>Maximum number of files and keywords in DB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Incidence Matrix Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N'</td>
<td>Number of ⌈\log_2 p⌉ - 1)-bit blocks (N' = ⌈\frac{N}{\log_2 p}⌉).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T_f, T_w</td>
<td>Static hash tables for files and keywords.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Set of dummy (empty) columns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Stash to (temporarily) store column data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Column counter vector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. The Proposed (Semi-Honest) ODSE Schemes

Intuition. In DSSE, keyword search and file update on I are read-only and write-only operations, respectively. This property permits us to leverage specific bandwidth-efficient oblivious access techniques for each operation such as multi-server PIR (for search) and Write-Only ORAM (for update) rather than using a generic ORAM. The second requirement is to identify a suitable data structure for I so that these bandwidth-efficient techniques can be adapted. In DSSE, forward index and inverted index are the ideal choices for the file update and keyword search operations, respectively as proposed in [19]. However, performing search and update on two isolated indexes will lead to inconsistency. The server might perform a synchronization to make two indices consistent; however, this will leak significant information regarding the client query and file content. Therefore, to avoid this problem, it is mandatory to seek a data structure, where both search index and update index can be integrated together. Fortunately, this can be achieved by harnessing a two-dimensional index (i.e., matrix), which allows keyword search and file update to be performed in two separate dimensions without creating any inconsistency at their intersections. This strategy permits us to perform computation-efficient (multi-server) PIR on one dimension, and communication-efficient (Write-Only) ORAM on the other dimension to achieve oblivious search and update, respectively.

In the following, we first describe the data structures used in ODSE framework, and then present semi-honest ODSE schemes in details. We analyze the security of ODSE schemes and present their extension into malicious setting in §5 and §6, respectively.

4.1. ODSE Data Structures

Our index to be stored at the server(s) is an incidence matrix (I), where each cell (I[i,j] ∈ {0,1}) represents the relationship between the keyword indexed at row i and the file indexed at column j. So, each row of I represents the search result of a keyword and each column represents the content of a file. Since we use Write-Only ORAM for file update, the number of columns in I are doubled to the maximum number of files that can be stored in the outsourced database. In other words, given N distinct files and M unique keywords in the database, our index is of size M × 2N. At the client side, we leverage two position maps T_w, T_f to keep track of location of keywords and files in I, respectively. They are of structure T := ⟨key, value⟩, where key is a keyword or file ID and value ← T[key] is the (row/column) index of key in I. Due to Write-Only ORAM, the client maintains a stash component (S) to temporarily store columns that might not be written back during the update due to the overflow.
We introduce ODSE$^{\text{wo}}_{\text{xor}}$, an ODSE scheme that offers a low search delay by using XOR trick. We present the setup algorithm in ODSE as well as its oblivious search and update protocols as follows.

Setup. Figure 5 presents setup algorithm to construct the encrypted index in ODSE. Specifically, it first initializes an unencrypted incidence matrix ($I'$) of size $M \times 2N$ (line 1), and generates a master key to be used for generating row keys to encrypt each row of $I'$ (line 3). It extracts unique keywords from input files (line 4), assigns each keyword and file into a row and column of $I'$ selected randomly (lines 6, 9), and then sets the value for each cell of $I'$ corresponding to the relationship between keywords and files (line 10). Finally, the algorithm generates a distinct key for each row of $I'$ by the master key (line 14), and encrypts each cell of $I'$ by a distinct pair of row key and column counter resulting in an encrypted index $I$ (line 14). We encrypt the index bit-by-bit and the resulting ciphertext $I[i,j]$ is one-bit long. This can be implemented by, for example, AES with CTR mode, where we generate 128-bit pseudorandom stream key by a master row key ($\tau_i$) and the column counter ($j \mid |c_j|$), but only XOR the plaintext bit with the most significant bit of the stream key. To this end, the client sends a replica of $I$ to $t$ servers and keeps some information (i.e., $\kappa, T_w, T_f, c$) private.

Search. ODSE$^{\text{wo}}_{\text{xor}}$ harnesses XOR-based PIR on the row dimension of $I$ to conduct the oblivious keyword search as shown in Figure 6. The client first looks up the keyword position map to get the row index of the searched keyword (line 1). The client then creates XOR-PIR queries (line 2) and sends them to corresponding servers, each answering the client with the output of the PIR retrieval algorithm (line 4). Notice that the data is IND-CPA encrypted rather than being public as in the traditional PIR model. Therefore, after recovering the row from the PIR retrieval (line 6), the client generates the row key (line 7) and then decrypts the row to obtain the search result (line 9).

Update. Recall that the content (i.e., keywords) of a file is represented by a column in $I$. Given a file $f_{id}$ to be updated, ODSE$^{\text{wo}}_{\text{xor}}$ applies Write-Only ORAM mechanism on the column dimension of $I$ to update keyword-file pairs in $f_{id}$ as shown in Figure 7. The client creates a new column representing the relationship between the updated file and keywords in the database (lines 2-3), and stores it in the stash (line 4). The client then randomly selects $\lambda$ column indexes and requests an arbitrary server to transmit

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(\sigma, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{ODSE}^{\text{wo}}_{\text{xor}}.\text{Setup}(\mathcal{F})$:
1: $I'[\ast, \ast] \leftarrow 0$, initialize counter $e \leftarrow (c_{i1}, \ldots, c_{2N})$ where $c_i \leftarrow 1 \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, 2N$
2: Let $\Pi$ and $\Pi'$ be a random permutation on $\{1, \ldots, 2N\}$ and $\{1, \ldots, M\}$ respectively
3: $\kappa \leftarrow E.\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$
4: Extract keywords $(w_1, \ldots, w_m)$ from files $\mathcal{F} = \{f_{id1}, \ldots, f_{idN}\}$
5: for $i = 1, \ldots, m$ do
6: $T_w[w_i] \leftarrow \Pi'(i)$
7: for $j = 1, \ldots, n$ do
8: $T_f[id_j] \leftarrow \Pi(j)$
9: if $w_i$ appears in $f_{id_j}$ then
10: $I'[x_i, y_j] \leftarrow 1$, where $x_i \leftarrow T_w[w_i], y_j \leftarrow T_f[id_j]$
11: for $i = 1, \ldots, M$ do
12: $\tau_i \leftarrow \text{KDF}_i(i)$ # Generating an encryption key for each row
13: for $j = 1, \ldots, 2N$ do
14: $[1[i, j] \leftarrow E.\text{Enc}_c(I'[i, j], j \mid |c_j]$ # Ciphertext $I[i, j]$ is one-bit long
15: Let $\mathcal{I}$ contain $t$ copies of $I$ and $\sigma \leftarrow (\kappa, T_w, T_f, c)$
16: return $(\sigma, \mathcal{I})$

Fig. 5. ODSE$^{\text{wo}}_{\text{xor}}$ setup algorithm.
```

4.2. ODSE$^{\text{wo}}_{\text{xor}}$. Fast ODSE

---

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\[
(R; \perp) \leftarrow \text{ODSE}_{\text{IR}}^{\text{RO}}.\text{Search}(w, \sigma; I):
\]

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Client}: \begin{enumerate}
\item \(i \leftarrow T_w[w]\)
\item \((\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_l) \leftarrow \text{PIR}^{\text{RO}}.\text{CreateQuery}(i)\)
\item \text{Send } \rho_l \text{ to } S_l \text{ for } l \in \{1, \ldots, l\}
\end{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Server}: each \(S_l \in \{S_1, \ldots, S_l\}\) receiving \(\rho_l\) do
\item \(I \leftarrow \text{PIR}^{\text{RO}}.\text{Retrievec}(\rho_l, I_l)\)
\item \text{Send } I \text{ to the client}
\end{enumerate}

\item \textbf{Client}: On receive \((I_1, \ldots, I_l)\) from \(\ell\) servers
\item \(I[I, s] \leftarrow \text{PIR}^{\text{RO}}.\text{Reconstruct}(I_1, \ldots, I_l)\)
\item \(\tau_j \leftarrow \text{KDF}_6(i)\)
\item \text{for } \(j = 1, \ldots, 2N\) do
\item \(I'[i, j] \leftarrow \text{Enc}_c(I[i, j], \tau[c_j])\)
\item \text{Let } \mathcal{J} := \{j : (I'[i, j] = 1) \text{ and } ((j \text{ is not dummy}) \text{ or } (I'[i, j] \in S))\}\)
\item \textbf{return} \((R; \perp)\), where \(R\) contains file IDs at column indexes in \(\mathcal{J}\)

\end{enumerate}

\textbf{Fig. 6. ODSE}_{\text{RO}}^{\text{IR}} search protocol.}

the corresponding columns of \(I\) (lines 5-6). The client generates row keys and decrypts \(\lambda\) columns (lines 7-10). The client overwrites dummy columns among \(\lambda\) columns with columns stored in the stash (lines 11-12). Finally, the client re-encrypts \(\lambda\) columns and sends them to \(\ell\) servers for index update (lines 18-20).

\[
(\sigma'; I') \leftarrow \text{ODSE}_{\text{IR}}^{\text{RO}}.\text{Update}(f_{\text{ud}}, \sigma; I):\n\]

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Client}: \begin{enumerate}
\item Initialize a column \(I[i] \leftarrow 0\) for \(i \in \{1, \ldots, 2N\}\)
\item \text{for each keyword } w_i \in f_{\text{ud}} \text{ do}
\item \(I[x] \leftarrow 1\), where \(x_i \leftarrow T_w[w_i]\)
\item \(S \leftarrow S \cup \{\langle id, I \rangle\} \text{ and } T_{\ell}[id] \leftarrow 0\)
\item \text{Let } \mathcal{J} \text{ contain } \lambda \text{ random-selected column indexes, send } \mathcal{J} \text{ to an arbitrary server } S_j\)
\item \textbf{Server}: On receive \(\mathcal{J}\) do
\item \text{Send } \langle I[*], j \rangle \rangle_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \text{ to the client}
\item \textbf{Client}: On receive \(\langle I[*], j \rangle \rangle_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \text{ do}
\item \text{for } \(i = 1, \ldots, M\) do
\item \(\tau_i \leftarrow \text{KDF}_6(i)\)
\item \text{for each index } j \in \mathcal{J} \text{ do}
\item \(I'[i, j] \leftarrow \text{Enc}_c(I[i, j], \tau[c_j])\)
\item \text{for each dummy index } j \in \mathcal{J} \text{ do}
\item \(I'[*, j] \leftarrow I\) and \(T_{\ell}[id] \leftarrow + j\), where \(\langle id, I \rangle\) is picked from \(S\)
\item \text{for each index } j \in \mathcal{J} \text{ do}
\item \(c_j \leftarrow c_j + 1\)
\item \text{for } \(i = 1, \ldots, M\) do
\item \(I[i, j] \leftarrow \text{Enc}_c(I[i, j], \tau[c_j])\)
\item \text{Send } \langle I[*], j \rangle \rangle_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \text{ to } \ell \text{ servers}
\item \textbf{Server}: each \(S_l \in \{S_1, \ldots, S_l\}\) receiving \(\langle I[*], j \rangle \rangle_{j \in \mathcal{J}}\) do
\item \text{for each } j \in \mathcal{J} \text{ do}
\item \(I[I, s] \leftarrow \text{Enc}_c(I[I, j], \tau[c_j])\)
\item \text{return } \(\langle \sigma', I' \rangle\) where \(I'\) is \(I\) updated at \(\ell\) servers, and \(\sigma'\) is updated client state
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

\textbf{Fig. 7. ODSE}_{\text{RO}}^{\text{IR}} update protocol.}
4.3. **ODSE\(^{\text{wo}}\) : Robust ODSE**

The described ODSE\(^{\text{xor}}\) scheme requires all \(\ell\) servers in the system to answer the client. If one server does not reply due to system/network failure, the correctness of ODSE\(^{\text{xor}}\) will not be hold anymore. We propose ODSE\(^{\text{wo}}\), an ODSE scheme that can achieve the robustness against unresponsive servers. ODSE\(^{\text{wo}}\) harnesses the \(t\)-out-of-\(\ell\) property of SSS, which allows to maintain the correctness given that some servers (i.e., up to \(\ell - t - 1\)) do not answer. We define the setup algorithm along with the oblivious search and update protocols in ODSE\(^{\text{wo}}\) scheme as follows.

**Setup.** ODSE\(^{\text{wo}}\) works over the index encrypted with IND-CPA encryption. Therefore, the setup algorithm of ODSE\(^{\text{wo}}\) is identical to that of ODSE\(^{\text{xor}}\) as shown in Figure 8.

**Search.** ODSE\(^{\text{wo}}\) harnesses SSS-based PIR protocol on the row dimension of \(I\) to conduct keyword search as shown in Figure 9. Specifically, the client first retrieves the row index of the searched keyword from the keyword position map (line 1). The client then creates SSS-based PIR queries (line 2) and sends to corresponding servers, each replying with the output of the SSS-based PIR retrieval algorithm. Notice that the SSS-based PIR retrieval algorithm performs the dot product between the client query and the database input via scalar multiplication and additive homomorphic properties of SSS. This requires the database input to be elements in \(F_p\). Since each row in \(I\) is a uniformly random binary string of length \(2N\) due to IND-CPA encryption, the servers split each row of \(I\) into \(2N'\) chunks \((c_k)\) with the equal size such that \(|c_k|< \log_2 p\) (line 6). The dot product is performed iteratively between the search query and divided chunks from all rows of \(I\) (lines 7-8). After receiving answers from \(\ell\) servers, the client recovers all chunks of the searched row (lines 10-12) and finally, decrypts the row to obtain the search result (lines 13-17).

**Update.** ODSE\(^{\text{wo}}\) harnesses Write-Only ORAM mechanism on the column dimension of \(I\) to perform file update. Since the index \(I\) in ODSE\(^{\text{wo}}\) is identical to ODSE\(^{\text{xor}}\) the update protocol of ODSE\(^{\text{wo}}\) is also identical to that of ODSE\(^{\text{xor}}\) (Figure 10).

4.4. **ODSE\(^{\text{it}}\) : Robust and Information-Theoretically Secure ODSE**

ODSE\(^{\text{it}}\) scheme relies on IND-CPA encryption for the encrypted index so that it only offers (at most) computational security. In this section, we introduce ODSE\(^{\text{it}}\), an ODSE scheme that can achieve the highest level of security (i.e., information-theoretic) for the index as well as any operations (search and update) on it. The main idea is to share the index with SSS, and harness SSS-based PIR to conduct private search. We describe the algorithms of ODSE\(^{\text{it}}\) as follows.

**Setup.** Figure 11 presents the setup algorithm to construct the distributed index in ODSE\(^{\text{it}}\). Specifically, it first constructs an (uncrypted) index \((I')\) representing keyword-file relationships as in other ODSE schemes. Instead of encrypting \(I'\) with an IND-CPA encryption scheme, it creates the shares of \(I'\) with SSS and distributes them to corresponding servers. As discussed above, SSS operates over elements in \(F_p\). Therefore, it is required to split each row of \(I'\) into \([\log_2 p]\)-bit chunks (line 4), and compute SSS share for each chunk (line 5). Therefore, the “encrypted” index \((I)\) in ODSE is the SSS share of \(I'\), which

\[
\sigma, I \leftarrow \text{ODSE}\^{\text{it}}\text{.Setup}(\mathcal{F}) \text{: Generate encrypted index}
\]

1. \(\sigma, I \leftarrow \text{ODSE}\^{\text{it}}\text{.Setup}(\mathcal{F})\)
2. \text{return} \((\sigma, I)\)

Fig. 8. ODSE\(^{\text{wo}}\) setup algorithm.
\begin{algorithm}
\begin{algorithmic}
\State \((\mathcal{R}; \bot) \leftarrow \text{ODSE}_{SS}^{\infty}.\text{Search}(w, \sigma; \mathcal{I})\):
\State \textbf{Client:}
\State 1: \(i \leftarrow T_{w}[w]\)
\State 2: \(([e]_1, \ldots, [e]_t) \leftarrow \text{PIR}_{SS}^{\infty}.\text{CreateQuery}(i)\)
\State 3: Send \([e]_l\) to \(S_l\) for \(l \in \{1, \ldots, t\}\)
\State \textbf{Server:} each \(S_j \in \{S_1, \ldots, S_t\}\) receiving \([e]_j\) do:
\State 4: for \(j = 1, \ldots, 2N'\) do
\State 5: for \(k = 1, \ldots, M\) do
\State 6: \(l_j^{(k)} = \left\lfloor \log_2 p \right\rfloor + 1 \ldots j \cdot \left\lfloor \log_2 p \right\rfloor\) # \(j^{\text{th}}\) batch of \(k^{\text{th}}\) row
\State 7: \(c_j^{(k)} = (c_j^{(k)}), \ldots, c_j^{(M)}\)
\State 8: \([b_j]_l \leftarrow \text{PIR}_{SS}^{\infty}.\text{Retrieve}([e]_j, c_j^{(l)})\)
\State 9: Send \(([b_1]_l, \ldots, [b_{2N'}]_l)\) to the client
\State \textbf{Client:} On receive \(\{B_j = ([b_j]_1, \ldots, [b_j]_l)\}^{2N'}_{j=1}\) from \(\ell\) servers
\State 10: for \(j = 1, \ldots, 2N'\) do
\State 11: \(b_j \leftarrow \text{PIR}_{SS}^{\infty}.\text{Reconstruct}(B_j, \ell)\)
\State 12: \(l_j \leftarrow \text{KDF}_{\ell}(i)\)
\State 13: \(\tau_j \leftarrow \text{KDF}_{\ell}(i)\)
\State 14: for \(j = 1, \ldots, 2N'\) do
\State 15: \(I'[i, j] \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\tau}(I[i, j], \tau_j)\)
\State 16: Let \(J := \{j : (I'[i, j] = 1)\) or \((j\text{ is not dummy})\) or \((I'[i, j] \in S_j)\}\)
\State 17: return \((\mathcal{R}; \bot)\), where \(\mathcal{R}\) contains file IDs at column indices in \(J\)
\end{algorithmic}
\caption{ODSE$_{SS}^{\infty}$ search protocol.}
\end{algorithm}

\begin{algorithm}
\begin{algorithmic}
\State \((\sigma'; \mathcal{I}') \leftarrow \text{ODSE}_{SS}^{\infty}.\text{Update}(f_{id}, \sigma; \mathcal{I})\):
\State 1: \((\sigma'; \mathcal{I}') \leftarrow \text{ODSE}_{SS}^{\infty}.\text{Update}(f_{id}, \sigma; \mathcal{I})\)
\State 2: return \((\sigma'; \mathcal{I}')\)
\end{algorithmic}
\caption{ODSE$_{SS}^{\infty}$ update protocol.}
\end{algorithm}

\begin{algorithm}
\begin{algorithmic}
\State \((\sigma, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{ODSE}_{SS}^{\infty}.\text{Setup}(\mathcal{F})\):
\State 1: \((\mathcal{F}, T_{w}, T_f) \leftarrow \text{Execute lines 2–10 in Figure 5}\)
\State 2: for \(i = 1, \ldots, M\) do
\State 3: for \(j = 1, \ldots, 2N'\) do
\State 4: \(l_j^{(i)} = \left\lfloor \log_2 p \right\rfloor + 1 \ldots j \cdot \left\lfloor \log_2 p \right\rfloor\) # Puts each row into a batch of size \(\left\lfloor \log_2 p \right\rfloor\)
\State 5: \((I[i, j], \ldots, I[l, j]) \leftarrow \text{SSS.\text{CreateShare}}([b_j]_l^{(i)}, \tau_j)\)
\State 6: return \((\sigma, \mathcal{I})\), where \(\mathcal{I} \leftarrow \{I_1, \ldots, I_t\}\) and \(\sigma \leftarrow (T_{w}, T_f)\)
\end{algorithmic}
\caption{ODSE$_{SS}^{\infty}$ setup algorithm.}
\end{algorithm}

is a matrix of size \(M \times 2N'\), where \(I[i, j] \in \mathbb{F}_p\) and \(N' = N/\left\lfloor \log_2 p \right\rfloor\). To this end, the client sends \(I_t\) to server \(S_t\) and keep position maps (i.e., \(T_{w}, T_f\)) secret.

\textbf{Search}. Similar to ODSE$_{SS}^{\infty}$, ODSE$_{SS}^{\infty}$ harnesses the SSS-based PIR protocol on the row dimension of \(I\) to conduct the keyword search as presented in Figure 12. General speaking, the client gets the row index to be searched from the keyword position map, creates SSS-based PIR queries and send them to the corresponding servers, each replying with the outputs of the SSS-based PIR retrieval algorithm (lines 1-6). Notice that since the index stored on \(S_t\) is a share matrix, each dot product computation in the SSS-based PIR retrieval algorithm will result in a share represented by a 2\(\ell\)-degree polynomial. Therefore,
Theorem 1. ODSE scheme is computationally ($\ell - 1$)-secure by Definition 3.

Proof. (Sketch) (i) Oblivious Search: ODSE scheme leverages XOR-based PIR and therefore, achieves ($\ell - 1$)-privacy for keyword search as proven in [36]. (ii) Oblivious Update: ODSE scheme employs Write-Only ORAM which achieves negligible write failure probability and therefore, it offers the statistical security without counting the encryption. The index in ODSE scheme is IND-CPA encrypted, which offers computational security. Therefore, in general, the update access pattern of ODSE scheme is computationally

The client needs to call the SSS-based recover algorithm with the privacy parameter of $2t$ (vs. $t$ as in ODSE scheme) to obtain the correct search result (line 8).

Update. Similar to other ODSE schemes, ODSE scheme harnesses Write-Only ORAM mechanism on the column dimension of the index for the oblivious file update as outlined in Figure 13. Specifically, the client creates a column representing the relationship between the updated file and keywords in the database, and temporarily stores it in the stash (lines 1-4). In ODSE scheme, each column of the share index $S_t$ actually contains the share of $\lfloor \log_2 p \rfloor$ columns of the unencrypted index $I'$. Therefore, it suffices to read $x' = \lfloor \log_2 p \rfloor$ random columns of $I_t$ from $t + 1$ arbitrary servers to reconstruct $x$ columns of $I'$ (lines 5-10). The update is similar to other ODSE schemes, in which the client actively over-writes dummy columns of $I'$ with columns stored in the stash (lines 11-12). Finally, the client creates new SSS shares for the retrieved columns (lines 13-16) and writes them back to $\ell$ servers (lines 18-20).

5. Security Analysis

Remark 1. One might observe that search and update operations in ODSE schemes are performed on rows and columns of the encrypted index, respectively. This access structure might enable the adversary to learn whether the operation is search or update, even though each operation is secure. Therefore, to achieve security as in Definition 3, where the query type should also be hidden, we can trigger both search and update protocols (one of them is the dummy operation) regardless of whether the intended action is search or update.

We argue the security of our proposed schemes as follows.

Theorem 1. ODSE scheme is computationally ($\ell - 1$)-secure by Definition 3.
Theorem 3.

\[ (s', t') \leftarrow \text{ODSE}_w^\text{Update}(f_{id}, s; t) \]

Client:
1. Initialize a column \( I[i] \leftarrow 0 \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, 2^N \)
2. for each keyword \( w_i \in f_{id} \) do
3. \( I[x_i] \leftarrow 1 \), where \( x_i \leftarrow T_v[w_i] \)
4. \( S \leftarrow S \cup \{(id, I)\} \) and \( T_j[i] \leftarrow 0 \)
5. Let \( J \) contain \( J \) random-selected column indexes, send \( J \) to \((t + 1)\) arbitrary servers \( S_1, \ldots, S_{t+1} \)

Server:
1. for each \( S_l \in \{S_1, \ldots, S_{t+1}\} \) receiving \( J \) do
2. Send \( \{I[i], S\} \}_{i \in J} \) to the client
3. for \( i = 1, \ldots, M \) do
4. for each index \( j \in J \) do
5. \( b_j \leftarrow \text{SSS.Recov}(B_j, r) \)
6. for each dummy column \( I^*[j] \) do
7. \( I^*[j] \leftarrow I^{*[j]} \) for \( (id, I) \) is picked from \( S \)
8. for each index \( j \in J \) do
9. for \( i = 1, \ldots, M \) do
10. \( (b_j)_\text{bin} \leftarrow I^*[i, j] \cdot \lfloor \log_2 p \rfloor + 1, \ldots, (j + 1) \cdot \lfloor \log_2 p \rfloor \) \( \rightarrow \langle b_j \rangle_{\text{bin}} \)
11. for each dummy column \( I^*[j] \) do
12. \( I^*[j] \leftarrow I^{*[j]} \) for \( (id, I) \) is picked from \( S \)
13. for each index \( j \in J \) do
14. for \( i = 1, \ldots, M \) do
15. \( (b_j)_\text{bin} \leftarrow I^*[i, j] \cdot \lfloor \log_2 p \rfloor + 1, \ldots, (j + 1) \cdot \lfloor \log_2 p \rfloor \) \( \rightarrow \langle b_j \rangle_{\text{bin}} \)
16. \( S \leftarrow \text{SSS.CreateShare}(b_j, r) \) \( \rightarrow \langle S \rangle \)
17. for each \( S_l \) receiving \( \{I[i], S\} \) \( \rightarrow \langle S \rangle \) do
18. for each \( j \in J \) do
19. \( I[i, j] \leftarrow I[i, j] \)
20. return \((s', t')\) where \( t' \) are updated at \( t \) servers and \( s' \) is updated client state

Fig. 13. ODSE\text{\textsuperscript{wo}} update protocol.

indistinguishable. ODSE\text{\textsubscript{wo}} performs Write-Only ORAM with an identical procedure on \( \ell \) servers (e.g., the indexes of accessed columns are the same in \( \ell \) servers), and therefore, the server coalition does not affect the update privacy of ODSE\text{\textsuperscript{wo}}. (iii) ODSE Security: By Remark 1, ODSE\text{\textsuperscript{wo}} achieves both search and update regardless of the actual operation. As analyzed, search is \((\ell - 1)\)-private and update pattern is computationally secure. Therefore, ODSE\text{\textsuperscript{wo}} achieves computational \((\ell - 1)\)-security by Definition 3. \( \square \)

Theorem 2. ODSE\text{\textsuperscript{wo}} scheme is computationally \( t \)-secure by Definition 3.

Proof. (Sketch) (i) Oblivious Search: ODSE\text{\textsubscript{wo}} leverages a SSS-based PIR protocol and therefore, achieves \( t \)-privacy for keyword search due to the \( t \)-privacy property of SSS as proven in [34, 35]. (ii) Oblivious Update: Similar to ODSE\text{\textsubscript{wo}}, ODSE\text{\textsubscript{wo}} leverages Write-Only ORAM over IND-CPA encrypted database, which offers computational security as shown in [37]. (iii) ODSE Security: By Remark 1, for each actual operation, the client triggers both search and update protocols. Given that search is \( t \)-private and update pattern is computationally oblivious, the access pattern in ODSE\text{\textsuperscript{wo}} is a computationally indistinguishable in the presence of \( t \) colluding servers. \( \square \)

Theorem 3. ODSE\text{\textsubscript{it}} scheme is information-theoretically (statistically) \( t \)-secure by Definition 3.

Proof. (Sketch) (i) Oblivious Search: ODSE\text{\textsubscript{it}} leverages an SSS-based PIR protocol and therefore, achieves \( t \)-privacy for keyword search due to the \( t \)-privacy property of SSS [34]. (ii) Oblivious Up-
date: The index in ODSE⁰ is SSS-shared, which is information-theoretically secure in the presence of \( t \) colluding servers. ODSE⁰ also employs Write-Only ORAM, which offers statistical security due to negligible write failure probability. Therefore in general, the update access pattern of ODSE⁰ scheme is information-theoretically (statistically) indistinguishable in the coalition of up to \( t \) servers. (iii) ODSE Security: By Remark 1, ODSE⁰ performs both search and update protocols regardless of the actual operation. As analyzed above, search is \( t \)-private and update pattern is statistically \( t \)-indistinguishable. Therefore, ODSE⁰ is information-theoretically (statistically) \( t \)-secure by Definition 3.

6. Maliciously-Secure ODSE

In previous sections, we have shown that ODSE schemes offer a certain level of collusion-resiliency and robustness in the semi-honest setting where the servers follow the protocol faithfully. In some privacy-critical applications, it is necessary to achieve data integrity and robustness in the malicious environment, where the adversary can tamper with the query and data to compromise the correctness and privacy of the protocol. In this section, we show that our proposed semi-honest ODSE schemes can be extended to be secure and robust against malicious adversaries.

6.1. MD-ODSE^wo: Maliciously-Detectable ODSE^wo

We present MD-ODSE^wo, the extended version of ODSE^wo from §4.2, which offers security against malicious adversary. Our main idea is to apply the message authentication code (MAC) to verify the integrity of the encrypted index. The verification allows the client to abort the protocol if he/she detects any malicious behaviors attempting to tamper with the encrypted index and/or the search/update query. Let \( \Sigma = (\text{Gen}, \text{Mac}, \text{Vrfy}) \) contain message authentication code algorithms for key generation, tag computation and verification of a tag respectively. Our MD-ODSE^wo protocols are defined as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
\sigma, I & \leftarrow \text{MD-ODSE}_{\text{MD-ODSE}^\text{wo}}\text{-Setup}(\mathcal{F}) : \\
1: & (\mathbf{I}, T_f, T_w, c, \kappa) \leftarrow \text{Execute lines 1-14 in Figure 5} \\
2: & \theta \leftarrow \Sigma.G\text{en}(1^k) \\
3: & \text{for } i = 1, \ldots, M \text{ do} \\
4: & \quad \text{for } j = 1, \ldots, 2N/|\tau| \text{ do} \\
5: & \quad \quad T[i, j] \leftarrow \Sigma.M\text{ac}([i, (j-1) \cdot |\tau| + 1 \ldots j \cdot |\tau|]) \\
6: & \text{Let } Z \text{ contain } t \text{ copies of } (\mathbf{I}, T) \text{ and } \sigma \leftarrow (\theta, \kappa, T_w, T_f, c) \\
7: & \text{return } (\sigma, Z)
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 14. MD-ODSE^wo setup algorithm. Extensions from its semi-honest version are highlighted.

**Setup.** Figure 14 presents the setup of MD-ODSE^wo scheme with the MAC tag generation for the encrypted index. Generally speaking, it first generates the encrypted index \( I \) similar to semi-honest ODSE^wo (line 1), and then generates a MAC key (line 2), followed by computing a matrix \( T \) containing the MAC tag for each \( |\tau| \)-bit blocks of each row of \( I \) (lines 3-5). In this context, each server in the system stores two matrices including the encrypted index \( I \) and the MAC matrix \( T \).

**Search.** Figure 15 presents the search protocol of MD-ODSE^wo, which is extended from the search protocol of semi-honest ODSE^wo to be secure against malicious adversary. Specifically, the client generates XOR-PIR queries for \( t \) servers similar to the semi-honest ODSE^wo scheme (line 1). Each server performs the XOR-PIR retrieval on both the encrypted index (line 3) and the MAC components (line...
using the same query received, and sends the result to the client. The client recovers the row of the encrypted index (line 6) as well as its corresponding tag (line 7). The client verifies each |τ|-bit block with its corresponding tag (lines 8-10). If all the tags are valid, the client continues to decrypt the row to obtain the search result as in the semi-honest ODSE scheme (line 11). Otherwise, the client aborts and notifies that at least one of the servers is malicious (line 10).

**Update.** Figure 16 presents the update protocol of MD-ODSE extended from the semi-honest ODSE scheme for malicious security. Instead of downloading ℓ random 1-bit columns as in the semi-honest ODSE scheme, the client downloads ℓ random columns of |τ|-bits as well as their corresponding MAC tag. Before decryption, the client verifies the integrity of the retrieved data by the MAC (lines 5-8). If there exists one invalid tag, the client aborts and notifies that at least one server is malicious (line 8). Otherwise, the client performs the update following the same line with the semi-honest ODSE scheme (line 9). Finally, the client creates new MAC tags for re-encrypted columns and send all of them to ℓ servers to be updated (lines 10-14).

### 6.2. MR-ODSE: Maliciously-Robust ODSE$_{ro}$

Since ODSE$_{ro}$ relies on SSS for oblivious search, we can extend it in various ways to not only detect but also be robust against malicious adversary. One straightforward extension is to consider SSS as a particular instance of Reed Solomon Code, and then implement Reed Solomon Decoding techniques [39, 40] to handle incorrect server replies. However, this approach can only handle a small number of the malicious servers in the system (e.g., $t < \ell/3$ if using [40]), which might increase the deployment cost. Another approach is to harness the $t$-out-of-$\ell$ threshold property of SSS along with the MAC technique presented in the previous section. The main idea is to select $(t + 1)$ answers among $\ell$ answers from the servers to recover the encrypted search result and its MAC tags. If there exists one invalid MAC, we repeat the recovery process by selecting a different set of $(t + 1)$ answers until we find that all the tags are valid. This strategy offers the detection capability and robustness against malicious behaviors given that the majority of the servers is honest (i.e., $t < \ell/2$). Therefore, we opt to this approach to design MR-ODSE, the maliciously-robust version of ODSE$_{ro}$ as follows.

```plaintext

(R; ⊥) ← MD-ODSE$_{wo}$ Search(w, σ; J):

Client:
1: \((ρ_1, \ldots, ρ_ℓ) ← \text{Execute lines 1-2 in Figure 6}\) (to learn that the keyword w corresponds to $i^{th}$ row and request retrieval of $i^{th}$ row privately)
2: Send $ρ_l$ to $S_l$ for $l \in \{1, \ldots, ℓ\}$
Server: each $S_l \in \{S_1, \ldots, S_ℓ\}$ receiving $ρ_l$ do
3: $I_l ← \text{Execute line 4 in Figure 6}$
4: $T_l ← \text{PIR}^{\text{XOR}}.\text{Retrieve}(ρ_l, T_l)$
5: Send $(I_l, T_l)$ to the client
Client: On receive $(\langle I_1, \ldots, I_ℓ \rangle, \langle T_1, \ldots, T_ℓ \rangle)$ from ℓ servers
6: $I[i, ⊗] ← \text{Execute line 6 in Figure 6}$
7: $T[i, ⊗] ← \text{PIR}^{\text{XOR}}.\text{Reconstruct}(T_1, \ldots, T_ℓ)$
8: for $j = 1, \ldots, 2N/|τ|$ do
9: if $\sum_{j'}\text{Vrfy}_j(I[i, j - 1] \cdot |τ| + 1 \ldots j \cdot |τ|, T[i, j]) = 0$ then
10: return abort
11: $J ← \text{Execute lines 7-10 in Figure 6}$
12: return $(R; ⊥)$, where $R$ contains file IDs at column indexes in $J$

Fig. 15. MD-ODSE$_{wo}$ search protocol. Extensions from its semi-honest version are highlighted.

4) using the same query received, and sends the result to the client. The client recovers the row of the encrypted index (line 6) as well as its corresponding tag (line 7). The client verifies each $|τ|$-bit block with its corresponding tag (lines 8-10). If all the tags are valid, the client continues to decrypt the row to obtain the search result as in the semi-honest ODSE$_{wo}$ scheme (line 11). Otherwise, the client aborts and notifies that at least one of the servers is malicious (line 10).
\[(\sigma',I') \leftarrow \text{MD-ODSE}_{\sigma}^w, \text{Update}(f_{\text{ud}}, \sigma; I)\):

\[\text{Client:}\]
1. \((S, T_f) \leftarrow \text{Execute lines 2-4 in Figure 7}\)
2. \(J' \leftarrow \text{Select } \lambda \text{ random indexes of } |\tau|\text{-bit columns in } I\)
3. \(\text{Send } J' \text{ to an arbitrary server } S_l\)

\[\text{Server } S_l: \text{On receive } J' \text{ do}\]
4. \(\text{Send } \{I[l,s,(j^f - 1) \cdot |\tau| + 1 \ldots j^f \cdot |\tau|], T[I,s,j^f]\}_{j^f \in J'} \text{ to the client}\)

\[\text{Client: On receive } \{I[l,s,(j^f - 1) \cdot |\tau| + 1 \ldots j^f \cdot |\tau|], T[I,s,j^f]\}_{j^f \in J'} \text{ do}\]
5. \(\text{for each } j^f \in J' \text{ do}\)
6. \(\text{for } i = 1, \ldots, M \text{ do}\)
7. \(\text{if } \sum_{j^f \in J'} (I[l,s,(j^f - 1) \cdot |\tau| + 1 \ldots j^f \cdot |\tau|], T[I,s,j^f]) = 0 \text{ then return abort}\)
8. \(\text{return } (\sigma', I')\)

Fig. 16. MD-ODSE\(_w^w\) update protocol. Extensions from its semi-honest version are highlighted.

**Setup.** The index structure of MR-ODSE\(_w^w\) is identical to that of MD-ODSE\(_w^w\). Thus, its setup algorithm is identical to that of MD-ODSE\(_w^w\), where the MAC tag is created for each \(|\tau|\)-bit blocks in each row of the encrypted index (Figure 17).

\[(\sigma, I) \leftarrow \text{ODSE}_{\sigma}^w, \text{Setup}(\mathcal{F})\):
1. \((\sigma, I) \leftarrow \text{MD-ODSE}_{\sigma}^w, \text{Setup}(\mathcal{F})\)
2. \(\text{return } (\sigma, I)\)

Fig. 17. MR-ODSE\(_w^w\) setup algorithm.

**Search.** Figure 18 outlines the search protocol of MR-ODSE\(_w^w\) extended from that of ODSE\(_w^w\) for malicious security. For each time of oblivious keyword search, the client creates SSS-based PIR query as in the semi-honest ODSE\(_w^w\) (line 1), and the servers perform the SSS-based PIR retrieval on both the encrypted index (line 3) and MAC components (line 4). Once receiving answers from \(\ell\) servers, the client picks \(t + 1\) out of \(\ell\) replies (lines 6-7), and performs the SSS recover via the Lagrange interpolation to obtain the encrypted search row (line 8) as well its MAC tag (lines 9-14). The client verifies the integrity of the encrypted columns and decrypts it if all MAC tags are valid. If there exists one invalid tag, the client aborts the protocol and notifies that a majority of servers (\(t > \ell/2\)) is corrupted (line 13).

**Update.** The update protocol in MR-ODSE\(_w^w\) is similar to that of MD-ODSE\(_x^w\) (Figure 19). To improve the robustness against malicious adversary, the client can request \(\ell\) servers to transfer \(\lambda\) \(|\tau|\)-bit columns, and selects one of \(\ell\) replies to verify the integrity and performs the update.
\[
\begin{align*}
(R \leftarrow \perp) & \leftarrow \text{MR-ODSE}^\text{ao} \text{ Search}(w, \sigma; I): \\
\text{Client:} & \\
1: & (i, (\{e_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq |\ell|})) \leftarrow \text{Execute lines 1-2 in Figure 9} \\
2: & \text{Send } [e_i] \text{ to } S_l \text{ for each } l \in \{1, \ldots, \ell\} \\
\text{Server:} & \text{each } S_l \in \{S_1, \ldots, S_l\} \text{ receiving } [e_i] \text{ do:} \\
3: & (\{b_1[l], \ldots, b_{2N[l]}[l]\}) \leftarrow \text{Execute lines 4-8 in Figure 9} \\
4: & [\tau]\_l \leftarrow \text{PIR}^\text{SSS}.\text{Retrieve}(\{e_i\], T_l[i, j]) \text{ for } j = 1, \ldots, 2N[\tau] \\
5: & \text{Send } (\{[\tau]\_l \}_{\tau=1}^{2N[\tau]}, \{[b_j]\}_{j=1}^{2N[\tau]}) \text{ to the client} \\
\text{Client:} & \text{On receive } \{([\tau]_1, \ldots, [\tau]_{2N[\tau]}], \{[b_1[i, j]]\}_{i=1}^{\ell} \} \text{ from } \ell \text{ servers} \\
6: & \mathcal{X} \leftarrow \text{Select } t + 1 \text{ servers among } \ell \text{ servers} \\
7: & \mathcal{B}_j \leftarrow \{[b_j[i]]_{x \in \mathcal{X}, j \in [2N]} \}, T_j \leftarrow \{[\tau]_i\}_{x \in \mathcal{X}, i \in [2N]} \} \\
8: & I[i, *] \leftarrow \text{Execute lines 10-12 in Figure 9} \\
9: & \text{for } j = 1, \ldots, 2N[\tau] \text{ do} \\
10: & (T[i, j]) \leftarrow \text{PIR}^\text{SSS}.\text{Reconstruct}(T_j, t) \\
11: & \text{if } \Sigma.\text{Vrfy}_p(I[i, j - 1] \cdot [\tau] + 1 \ldots \tau, T[i, j]) = 0 \text{ then} \\
12: & \text{if all distinct subset } \mathcal{X} \text{ have been processed} \text{ then} \\
13: & \text{return abort} \\
14: & \mathcal{X} \leftarrow \text{Select another set of } t + 1 \text{ servers and go to line 7} \\
15: & J \leftarrow \text{Execute lines 13-17 in Figure 9} \\
16: & \text{return } (R, \perp), \text{where } R \text{ contains file IDs at column indexes in } J \\
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 18. MR-ODSE\textsuperscript{ao} search protocol. Extensions from its semi-honest version are highlighted.

\[
\begin{align*}
(\sigma'; I') & \leftarrow \text{MR-ODSE}^\text{ao} \text{ Update}(f_d, \sigma; I): \\
1: & (\sigma'; I') \leftarrow \text{MD-ODSE}^\text{ao}.\text{Update}(f_d, \sigma; I) \\
2: & \text{return } (\sigma'; I') \\
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 19. MR-ODSE\textsuperscript{ao} update protocol.

6.3. MR-ODSE\textsuperscript{ao}: Maliciously-Robust and IT-Secure ODSE\textsuperscript{ao}

In this section, we present MR-ODSE\textsuperscript{ao}, the extended version of ODSE\textsuperscript{ao} that inherits all properties of ODSE\textsuperscript{ao} (e.g., information-theoretic security) along with the robustness against malicious adversary. To preserve the information-theoretic security, we create an information-theoretic MAC for each block.

The main idea is to create a global MAC key $\theta \in \mathbb{F}_p$, which is known only by the client. The MAC tag $\tau$ for each block $b$ of the index is computed as $\tau = \theta \cdot b$ (over $\mathbb{F}_p$). Given that the client maintains a consistent relationship between $\tau$, $b$ and $\theta$ while keeping them hidden from the adversary (which can be achieved via SSS), the adversary cannot change $b$ without changing $\tau$ and/or $\alpha$. The details are as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
(\sigma, I) & \leftarrow \text{MR-ODSE}^\text{ao}.\text{Setup}(\mathcal{F}): \\
1: & (\{l_1, \ldots, l_\ell\}, T_w, T_f, \{b_{11}, \ldots, b_{M2N'}\}) \leftarrow \text{Execute lines 1-5 in Figure 12} \\
2: & \alpha \in \mathbb{F}_p \\
3: & (T_1[l, j], \ldots, T_\ell[l, j]) \leftarrow \text{SSS}.\text{CreateShare}(\alpha \cdot b_{ij}, t) \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, M \text{ and for } j = 1, \ldots, 2N' \\
4: & \text{return } (\sigma, I), \text{where } I \leftarrow \{l_1, \ldots, l_\ell\}, \{T_1[l, j], \ldots, T_\ell[l, j]\} \text{ and } \sigma \leftarrow (\alpha, T_w, T_f) \\
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 20. MR-ODSE\textsuperscript{ao} setup algorithm. Extensions from its semi-honest version are highlighted.

**Setup.** MR-ODSE\textsuperscript{ao} follows the principles in the semi-honest ODSE\textsuperscript{ao} scheme to create the share index (Figure 20, line 1). It then creates a global MAC key by selecting a random element in $\mathbb{F}_p$ (line 2).
It multiplies the representative element in $F_p$ of each index block with the global MAC key over $F_p$, yielding the MAC tag, and then creates the SSS shares for each tag (line 3). The SSS shares of MAC tags are distributed along with the share index across $\ell$ servers.

$$\langle \tau; \perp \rangle \leftarrow \text{MR-ODSE}_{\text{aw}}.\text{Search}(w, \sigma; \mathcal{I})$$

1: $(t, \langle [e_1], \ldots, [e_\ell] \rangle) \leftarrow \text{Execute lines 1-2 in Figure 12}$
2: Send $\langle e \rangle_i$ to $S_i$ for each $i \in \{1, \ldots, \ell\}$

Server: each $S_i \in \{S_1, \ldots, S_\ell\}$ receiving $[e]_i$ do
3: $\langle [b_1], \ldots, [b_{2N'}] \rangle \leftarrow \text{Execute lines 4-5 in Figure 12}$
4: $\langle \tau_j \rangle \leftarrow \text{PIR}_{\text{SSS}}.\text{Retrieve}([e]_i, T_j[[*], j])$ for each $j \in \{1, \ldots, 2N'\}$
5: Send $\langle ([T_1], \ldots, [T_{2N'}]) \rangle, \langle (b_1, \ldots, b_{2N'}) \rangle$ to the client

Client: On receive $\langle ([T_1], \ldots, [T_{2N'}]), \langle b_1, \ldots, b_{2N'} \rangle \rangle_{2N'=1}$ from $\ell$ servers
6: $X \leftarrow \text{Select } 2t+1 \text{ servers among } \ell \text{ servers}$
7: $B_j \leftarrow \{[b_j]_i \mid \forall i \in [2N'] \}$, $T_j \leftarrow \{[T_j]_i \mid \forall i \in [2N'] \}$
8: $(b_1, \ldots, b_{2N'}) \leftarrow \text{Execute lines 7-8 in Figure 12}$
9: for $j = 1, \ldots, 2N'$ do
10: $\tau_j \leftarrow \text{PIR}_{\text{SSS}}.\text{Reconstruct}(T_j, 2t)$
11: if $(a \cdot b_j \neq \tau_j)$ then
12: if (all distinct subset $X$ have been processed) then
13: return abort
14: $X \leftarrow \text{Select another set of } 2t+1 \text{ servers and goto line 7}$
15: $\mathcal{F} \leftarrow \text{Execute lines 9-10 in Figure 12}$
16: return $(\mathcal{R}; \perp)$, where $\mathcal{R}$ contains file IDs at column indexes in $\mathcal{F}$

Fig. 21. MR-ODSE$_{\text{aw}}$ search protocol. Extensions from its semi-honest version are highlighted.

Search. Figure 21 presents the search protocol of MR-ODSE$_{\text{aw}}$ extended from that of ODSE$_{\text{aw}}$ for malicious security. The extension follows the line of the MR-ODSE$_{\text{aw}}$ scheme. Specifically, the servers perform SSS-based PIR retrieval on both index and the MAC components (lines 3-4). The client picks $2t+1$ out of $\ell$ replies to recover and verify the integrity of the search result (lines 6-7). If after $(\ell/2t+1)$ trials with different subsets but none producing the valid tags, the client aborts the protocol and notifies that more than $\ell/3$ servers are malicious (line 7). Otherwise, the client continues to process the recovered data as in the semi-honest MR-ODSE$_{\text{aw}}$ scheme to obtain the final search result (line 15).

Update. Figure 22 presents the update protocol of MR-ODSE$_{\text{aw}}$. Basically, the client downloads $\lambda$ columns of the share index and their corresponding MAC from $\ell$ servers. The client selects $t+1$ replies to recover and verify the integrity of downloaded data before performing update. If all tags are valid, the client performs the write-only ORAM procedure as in ODSE$_{\text{aw}}$ scheme, recalculates the MAC tag for each block, and then creates new SSS shares for each tag. Otherwise, the client aborts the protocol and notifies that a majority of servers is malicious.

7. Implementation

We fully implemented all ODSE schemes in C++ with approximately 4,000 lines of code for each scheme. We used Google Sparsehash library [41] to implement position maps $T_f$ and $T_w$. We utilized Intel AES-NI library [42] to implement AES-CTR encryption/decryption in ODSE$_{\text{aw}}$ and ODSE$_{\text{aw}}$ schemes. We leveraged Shoup NTL library [43] for pseudo-random number generator and arithmetic operations over finite field. We used ZeroMQ library [44] for client-server communication. We used
multi-threading technique to accelerate PIR computation at the server. The full implementation of our framework is publicly available at https://github.com/thanghoang/ODSE.

8. Performance Evaluation

8.1. Configurations

Hardware and network settings. We used Amazon EC2 with r4.4xlarge instance for server(s), each equipped with 16 vCPUs Intel Xeon @ 2.3 GHz and 122 GB RAM. We used a laptop with Intel Core i5 @ 2.90 GHz and 16 GB RAM as the client. All machines ran Ubuntu 16.04. The client established a network connection with the server via WiFi connection. We used a real network setting, in which the download and upload throughputs are 27 and 5 Mbps, respectively.

Dataset. We used the subsets of the Enron dataset to build I containing from millions to billions of keyword-file pairs. The largest dataset contain around 300,000 files with 320,000 unique keywords. Our tokenization is identical to [25] so that our keyword distribution and query pattern are similar to [25].

Instantiation of compared techniques. We compared ODSE with a standard DSSE scheme [7], and the use of generic ORAM atop the DSSE encrypted index. The performance of all schemes was measured under the same setting and configuration. We configured ODSE schemes and their counterparts as follows.

- ODSE: For the semi-honest setting, we deployed two servers for ODSE$_{wo}$ and ODSE$_{d}$ schemes, and three servers for ODSE$_{rot}$ scheme. We selected $\lambda = 4$ for ODSE$_{wo}$ and ODSE$_{d}$, and $\lambda' = 4$ with $\mathbb{F}_p$, where $p$ is a 16-bit prime for ODSE$_{wo}$ schemes ODSE$_{d}$. We note that selecting larger $p$ (e.g., $|p| = 64$...
8.2. Overall End-to-end Delay in the Semi-honest Setting

Figure 23 presents the end-to-end delays of ODSE schemes and their counterparts, where we performed both search and update protocols in ODSE schemes to hide the actual type of operation (see Remark 1). ODSE offers a higher security than standard DSSE at the cost of a longer delay. Nevertheless, ODSE schemes are $3 \times -57 \times$ faster than the use of generic ORAMs atop DSSE encrypted index to hide the access patterns. Specifically, with an encrypted index consisting of ten billions of keyword-file pairs, $\Pi_{2\text{lev}}$ cost 36 milliseconds and 600 milliseconds to finish a search and update operation, respectively. ODSE$_{\omega r}$ and ODSE$_{\omega t}$, respectively, took 2.8 seconds and 8.6 seconds to accomplish both keyword
As shown in Figure 24, the client computation contributes the least amount to the overall search delay (less than 10%) in all ODSE schemes. It comprises the following operations: (i) Generate search queries with PRF in ODSE_{xor} and ODSE_{ro} because the client transmitted data to three servers, instead of two. We can see that in many cases, where it is not necessary to hide the operation types (search/update), using ODSE to conduct individual oblivious operations, especially the keyword search, is much more efficient than generic ORAMs. We further provide a comparison of ODSE schemes with their counterparts in Table 2. In the following section, we dissect the end-to-end delay of ODSE schemes to understand which factors contributing the most to their performance.

8.3. Detailed Cost Analysis

Figure 24 presents the detailed delays of separate keyword search and file update operations in ODSE schemes. There are three main factors impacting the end-to-end delay of ODSE schemes as follows.

Client processing: As shown in Figure 24, the client computation contributes the least amount to the overall search delay (less than 10%) in all ODSE schemes. It comprises the following operations: (i) Generate search queries with PRF in ODSE_{xor} or SSS in ODSE_{ro} and ODSE_{ro} schemes; (ii) SSS recovery (in ODSE_{ro} and ODSE_{ro}) and/or IND-CPA decryption (in ODSE_{ro} and ODSE_{ro}); (iii) Filter
The cost of PIR operations in ODSE schemes is the most dominating factor in the delay of ODSE. In contiguous memory layout organization allows the inner product in PIR to access memory access-efficient since we store their matrix-based index column-wise in the memory. This memory access-ness to overwrite some columns of the encrypted index. ODSE\textsubscript{xor} and ODSE\textsubscript{ro} schemes, the size of components in the search query vector is 16 bits. Their communication overhead can be reduced by using a smaller finite field at the cost of increased PIR computation on the server side.

- **Client-server communication:** Data transmission is the most dominating factor in the delay of ODSE schemes. The communication cost of ODSE\textsubscript{xor} is the smallest among all ODSE schemes since the size of search query and the data transmitted from servers are only binary strings. In ODSE\textsubscript{ro} and ODSE\textsubscript{it} schemes, the size of components in the search query vector is 16 bits. Their communication overhead can be reduced by using a smaller finite field at the cost of increased PIR computation on the server side.

- **Server processing:** The cost of PIR operations in ODSE\textsubscript{xor} is negligible as it uses XOR tricks. The PIR computation overhead in ODSE\textsubscript{ro} and ODSE\textsubscript{it} is reasonable because it operates on a considerably large amount of 16-bit values. For the file update operations, the server-side cost is mainly due to memory accesses to overwrite some columns of the encrypted index. ODSE\textsubscript{ro} and ODSE\textsubscript{it} schemes are highly memory access-efficient since we store their matrix-based index column-wise in the memory. This memory layout organization allows the inner product in PIR to access contiguous memory blocks thereby, minimizing the memory access delay not only in the update but also in the search. In ODSE\textsubscript{xor}, we stored the matrix row-wise for row-friendly access to permit efficient XOR operations during search. However, this requires file update to access non-contiguous memory blocks. Hence, the file update in ODSE\textsubscript{xor} incurred a higher memory access delay than that of ODSE\textsubscript{ro} and ODSE\textsubscript{it} as shown in Figure 24.

### 8.4. Storage overhead

The main limitation of ODSE schemes is the size of encrypted index, whose asymptotic cost is $O(N \cdot M)$, where $N$ and $M$ are the number of files and unique keywords, respectively. Given the largest database being experimented, the size of our encrypted index is 23 GB. The client storage includes two position maps of size $O(M \log M)$ and $O(N \log N)$, the stash of size $O(M \cdot \log N)$, a counter vector of size $\Omega(N)$ and a master key (in ODSE\textsubscript{xor} scheme). Empirically, with the same database size discussed...
above, the client requires approximately 22 MB in all ODSE schemes.

8.5. Experiment with various query sizes

We studied the performance of our schemes and their counterparts in the context of various keyword and file numbers involved in search and update operations that we refer to as “query size”. As shown in Figure 25, ODSE schemes are more efficient than using generic ORAMs when more than 5% of keywords/files in the database are involved in the search/update operations. Since the complexity of ODSE schemes is linear to the number of keywords and files (i.e., $O(M + N)$), their delay is constant and independent from the query size. The complexity of ORAM approaches is $O(r \log_2 (N \cdot M))$, where $r$ is the query size. Although the bandwidth cost of ODSE schemes is asymptotically linear, their actual delay is much lower than using generic ORAM, whose cost is poly-logarithmic to the total number of keywords/files but linear to the query size. This confirms the results of Naveed et al. in [25] on the performance limitations of generic ORAM and DSSE composition, wherein we used the same dataset for our experiments.

8.6. ODSE Performance in the Presence of Malicious Adversary

In this section, we present the performance of maliciously-secure ODSE schemes described in §6. Figure 26 presents the search and update delay of MD-ODSE$_{wo}$, MR-ODSE$_{wo}$ and MR-ODSE$_{g}$ schemes in the presence of one malicious adversary, compared with their corresponding semi-honest version. Recall that in this setting, we set the number of servers in the system for MD-ODSE$_{wo}$, MR-ODSE$_{wo}$ and MR-ODSE$_{g}$ schemes to be two, three and four, respectively. We can see that the search delays of maliciously-secure ODSE schemes are around two times slower than their semi-honest version. It is mainly due to the additional processing and network transmission overhead for the MAC components stored at the server-side, which has the same size with the encrypted index. The update of MR-ODSE$_{wo}$ and MR-ODSE$_{g}$ schemes are around three times slower than that of their semi-honest version. The main reason is that MR-ODSE$_{wo}$ and MR-ODSE$_{g}$ requires an extra server in the system to detect one malicious adversary, which leads to the increase of the client bandwidth overhead.
We also explored the performance of maliciously-secure ODSE schemes when the number of malicious servers increases. Allowing more servers to be malicious requires to deploy more servers in the system. Specifically, MR-ODSE\textsuperscript{wo} and MR-ODSE\textsuperscript{it} schemes need $2t+1$ and $3t+1$ servers in total to be robust against $t$ malicious servers, respectively. Figure 27 presents the performance of maliciously-secure ODSE schemes with the varied number of malicious adversaries. We can see that it is expensive to offer the robustness for a number of malicious servers in the system. This is because it incurs not only the client bandwidth overhead to communicate with more servers, but also the client computation overhead. In the worst case, MR-ODSE\textsuperscript{wo} and MR-ODSE\textsuperscript{it} requires the client to perform $(\ell t + 1)$ and $(2\ell t + 1)$ MAC verifications, respectively, to find an authentic $|t|$-bit data block in the presence of (less than) $t$ malicious servers. Since MD-ODSE\textsuperscript{xor} can only detect the malicious behavior (without knowing which server it is), its overhead only increases slightly when allowing more servers to be malicious. This is because it only requires to deploy more servers in the system, and the client aborts the protocol immediately when he/she finds an invalid MAC tag (without trying aggressively to find an alternative authentic block as in MR-ODSE\textsuperscript{wo} and MR-ODSE\textsuperscript{it} schemes).

9. Conclusion

In this article, we present a new Oblivious Distributed DSSE framework called ODSE, which offers full obliviousness, hidden size pattern, and low end-to-end for index access. These properties are achieved by exploiting unique characteristics of the index data structure and searchable encryption, which allows to deploy computation- and bandwidth-efficient techniques (i.e., multi-server PIR and Write-Only ORAM) to conduct oblivious search and update separately. Our framework contains a series of ODSE schemes each featuring different levels of performance and security in terms of data confidentiality and access pattern obliviousness. Specifically, ODSE\textsuperscript{xor} offers the lowest end-to-end delay, smallest bandwidth overhead and the highest resiliency against colluding servers. ODSE\textsuperscript{wo} offers the robustness and information-theoretic security for access patterns and the encrypted index. ODSE\textsuperscript{it} inherits the best of both ODSE\textsuperscript{xor} and ODSE\textsuperscript{it} schemes: low end-to-end delay and robustness in the distributed setting. All these schemes can also be extended to be secure/robust against malicious adversary.
Fig. 27. Delay of maliciously-secure ODSE schemes with varied number of malicious servers.

References


[41] sparsehash: An extremely memory efficient hash_map implementation, February 2012.


